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Abstract
The inertia of the local-currency prices of traded goods in the face of exchange-rate changes
is a well-documented phenomenon in International Economics. This paper develops a frame-
work for identifying the sources of local-currency price stability at each stage of the distribution
chain. The empirical approach exploits manufacturers￿and retailers￿￿rst-order conditions in
conjunction with detailed information on the frequency of price adjustments in response to
exchange-rate changes, in order to quantify the relative importance of nominal price rigidities,
local-cost non-traded components, and markup adjustment by manufacturers and retailers in
the incomplete transmission of exchange-rate changes to prices. The approach is applied to
micro data from the beer market.
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11 Introduction
The incomplete transmission of exchange-rate shocks to consumer prices has been the focus of
a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical research. Aided by the increased availability
of micro data sets, a set of recent studies has focused on the microeonomics of the cross-border
transmission process, trying to identify the sources of this price inertia within structural models of
particular industries (Goldberg (1995), Goldberg and Verboven (2001), Hellerstein (2005)). The
basic structure of the approach proposed in this strand of the literature is as follows. The starting
point is an empirical model of the industry under consideration. The model has three elements:
demand, costs, and equilibrium conditions. The demand side is estimated ￿rst, independently of
the supply side, using either consumer level data on individual transactions, or product level data
on market shares and prices. On the supply side, the cost function of a producer selling in a foreign
country is speci￿ed in a way that allows for both a traded, and a non-traded, local (i.e., destination-
market speci￿c) component in this producer￿ s costs. Costs are treated as unobservable. Assuming
that ￿rms act as pro￿t maximizers, the market structure of the industry in conjunction with
particular assumptions regarding ￿rms￿strategic behavior imply a set of ￿rst-order conditions.
Once the demand side parameters are estimated, these ￿rst-order conditions can be exploited to
back out the marginal costs and markups in the industry. Based on the speci￿ed cost function,
marginal costs are further decomposed into a traded and non-traded component. With this
decomposition in place, one then examines how the particular components of prices (traded cost
component, non-traded cost component, and markup) respond to exchange-rate changes. The
lack of price response is accordingly attributed to either markup adjustment, or to the existence
of a local, non-traded cost component. While the results of this decomposition naturally vary by
industry, it seems that existing studies are in agreement that markup adjustment is a big part
of the story. The observed exchange-rate pass-through is however too low to be explained by
markup adjustment alone; accordingly, the role attributed to non-traded costs in explaining the
incomplete price response is non-trivial.
While the above framework allows one to evaluate the relative contributions of markup adjust-
ment and non-traded costs in explaining incomplete exchange-rate pass-through, it is inherently
unsuitable to assessing the role of another potential source of the incomplete price response: the
existence of nominal price rigidities. There are two reasons for this inadequacy. The ￿rst reason
is a conceptual one. A key element of the framework described above is the premise that the
￿rms￿￿rst-order conditions hold every period. Given that by assumption ￿rms are always at the
equilibrium implied by their pro￿t maximizing conditions, there is no role in this framework for
price rigidities that would cause ￿rms to (temporarily) deviate from their optimal behavior. The
second reason is a practical one. Because the data used in previous studies are either annual or
2monthly, and because they are often the outcome of aggregation across more disaggregate product
categories, we observe product level prices changing in every period. But with prices adjusting
every period, it is inherently impossible to identify potential nominal price rigidities, which by
nature imply that prices should remain ￿xed. Hence, to the extent that any price rigidities are
present, these may be masked by the aggregation across di⁄erent product lines, and across shorter
time periods (e.g., weeks), over which nominal prices may exhibit inertia.
The current paper attempts to extend the previously proposed framework by explicitly intro-
ducing price rigidities in the model and suggesting an approach for quantifying their importance
in explaining the documented incomplete cross-border transmission of exchange-rate shocks. To
this end, we introduce two new elements.
The ￿rst one is to modify the standard framework of pro￿t maximization to allow ￿rms to
deviate from their ￿rst-order conditions due to the existence of nominal price rigidities. In this
context we de￿ne price rigidities in the broadest possible sense as all factors that may cause ￿rms
to keep their prices constant, and hence potentially deviate from the optimum implied by pro￿t
maximization. Such factors may include the small costs of re-pricing (the so-called ￿menu-costs￿ )
as well as the more substantive costs associated with the management￿ s time and e⁄ort in ￿guring
out the new optimal price, the additional costs of advertising and more generally communicating
the price change to the consumers, etc..
The second innovation of the paper is on the data side. In order to identify the potential
role of nominal price rigidities we propose using higher frequency (weekly or bi-weekly) data
on the prices of highly disaggregate, well-de￿ned product lines. The advantage of using high-
frequency data is that we observe many periods during which the price of a product remains
utterly unchanged, followed by a discrete jump of the price to a new level. It is this discreteness
in the price adjustment that we exploit in order to identify the role of nominal price rigidities.
The basic idea behind our approach is as follows. First, even with nominal price rigidities, we
can estimate the demand and cost parameters of the model along the lines described in earlier
papers by constraining the estimation to the periods for which we observe price adjustment; the
underlying premise is that once a ￿rm decides to incur the adjustment cost associated with a
price change, it will set the product￿ s price according to the ￿rst-order conditions of its pro￿t
maximization problem. This of course does not imply that this ￿rm￿ s behavior will be una⁄ected
by the existence of price rigidities. Such rigidities may still have an indirect e⁄ect on the pricing
behavior of ￿rms that adjust their prices, as in any model of oligopolistic interaction ￿rms take
the prices (or quantities) of their competitors into account; if the competitor prices do not change
in particular period (possibly because of price rigidities), this will a⁄ect the pricing behavior of
the ￿rms that do adjust prices. The estimation procedure takes this indirect e⁄ect into account.
3Once the model parameters are estimated, we exploit information from both the periods
in which prices adjust and periods in which prices remain unchanged to derive bounds on the
adjustment costs associated with a price change. Our approach is based on the insight that in
periods in which prices change, it has to be the case that the costs of price adjustment are lower
than the additional pro￿t the ￿rm makes by changing its price; we can use this insight to derive
an upper bound of this price adjustment cost. Similarly, in periods in which prices do not change,
it has to be the case that the costs of adjustment exceed the extra pro￿t associated with a price
change; based on this insight, we can derive a lower bound for the price adjustment cost.
The magnitude of the price adjustment costs is interesting in its own right as the nature
and size of these costs have been the subject of a considerable amount of research in the past.1
However, the adjustments costs alone do not allow a full assessment of the impact of nominal price
rigidities on exchange-rate pass-through; because such rigidities have both a direct and an indirect
(operating through the competitor prices) e⁄ect on ￿rms￿pricing behavior, it is possible that very
small rigidities induce signi￿cant price inertia. To provide an overall assessment of the impact of
price adjustment costs we therefore perform simulations that compare the pricing behavior with
price rigidities to the one that would prevail with fully ￿ exible prices. The di⁄erential response of
prices in the two scenarios is attributed to the e⁄ect of nominal price rigidities. In the same step
we also identify the role of markup adjustment and non-traded costs in generating incomplete
pass-through.
We apply the framework described above to weekly, store-level data for the beer market. The
beer market is well suited for investigating questions related to exchange-rate pass-through and
price rigidities for several reasons: (1) a signi￿cant fraction of brands are imported and hence
a⁄ected by exchange-rate ￿ uctuations; (2) exchange-rate pass-through onto consumer prices is
low, on the order of 10%; (3) there exist highly disaggregate, weekly data on both wholesale and
retail prices; this allows us to examine how prices respond at each stage of the distribution chain;
(4) both non-traded local costs and price rigidities are a-priori plausible; in particular, weekly
data reveal that both wholesale and retail prices remain constant over the course of several weeks,
suggesting the existence of price rigidities. The framework we propose is however not tailored to
the beer market, and can be more generally applied to any market for which high frequency data
are available so that the points of price adjustment can be identi￿ed.
1Levy et al (1997) ￿nd menu costs to equal 0.70 percent of supermarkets￿revenue from time-use data. Dutta
et al (1999) ￿nd menu costs to equal 0.59 percent of drugstores￿revenue. Levy et al have four measures of menu
costs: 1. the labor cost to change prices; 2. the costs to print and deliver new price tags; 3. the costs of mistakes; 4.
the costs of in-store supervision of the price changes. Some detailed microeconomic studies have cast doubt on the
importance of menu cost in price rigidity. Blinder et al (1998) ￿nd in a direct survey that managers do not regard
menu costs as an important cause of price rigidity. Carlton (1986) and Kashyap (1995) ￿nd that ￿rms change prices
frequently and in small increments, which is not consistent with a menu-cost explanation of price rigidity.
4The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. To set the stage, we start by providing
a brief description of the market and the data in the next section; in the same section, we
also provide some descriptive statistics and discuss the price adjustment patterns evident in the
retail and wholesale price data. Section 3 discusses the model and shows how it allows us to
derive bounds for the price adjustment costs. Section 4 discusses the steps of the empirical
implementation of the model in detail, and Section 5 presents some preliminary results.
2 The Market and the Data
In this section we describe the market our data cover. We present summary statistics and some
preliminary descriptive results to build intuition for the results from the structural model. We
then discuss some of the price-adjustment patterns in the data.
2.1 Market
The imported beer market ￿rst developed in the U.S. in the nineteenth century. The Dutch brand
Heineken, was imported to the U.S. beginning in 1894. The invention of the metal beverage can
in 1935 enabled domestic brewers to build national brands without bearing the high ￿xed costs
of maintaining local centers to collect deposit-return glass bottles. Such brands dominated U.S.
consumption from that point until quite recently. As late as 1970, imported beers made up less
than one percent of the total U.S. consumption of beer. Consumption of imported brands grew
slowly in the 1980s and by double digits for each year in the 1990s ￿on average by 11 percent
per year from 1993 to 2001 ￿resulting in a market share of over seven percent by the end of
the decade. Beer is an example of one type of imported good: packaged goods imported for
consumption. Such imports do not require any further manufacture before reaching consumers
and make up roughly half of the non-oil goods imports to the U.S. over the sample period.
The beer market is well suited for an exploration of the sources of local-currency price sta-
bility for the reasons discussed in the introduction: a signi￿cant fraction of brands are imported;
exchange-rate pass-through to prices is generally low (between ten and ￿fteen percent); both
non-traded local costs and price stickiness due to adjustments costs are a-priori plausible; and
we have a rich panel data set with weekly retail and wholesale prices. It is unusual to observe
both retail and wholesale prices for a single product over time. These enable us to isolate the
role of local nontraded costs and of ￿xed adjustment costs in ￿rms￿incomplete transmission of
exchange-rate shocks to their prices.
52.2 Data
Our data come from Dominick￿ s Finer Foods, the second-largest supermarket chain in the Chicago
metropolitan area in the mid 1990s with a market share of roughly 20 percent. The data record
the retail and wholesale prices for each product sold by Dominick￿ s over a period of four years.
They were gathered by the Kilts Center for Marketing at the University of Chicago￿ s Graduate
School of Business and include aggregate retail volume market shares and retail prices for every
major brand of beer sold in the U.S.2 Beer shipments in this market are handled by independent
wholesale distributors. The model abstracts from this additional step in the vertical chain, and
assumes distributors are vertically integrated with brewers, in the sense that brewers bear their
distributors￿costs and control their pricing decisions. It is common knowledge in the industry
that brewers set their distributors￿prices through a practice known as resale price maintenance
and cover a signi￿cant portion of their distributors￿marginal costs.3 This practice makes the
analysis of pricing behavior along the distribution chain relatively straight-forward, as one can
assume that distributors are, de facto, vertically integrated with brewers.
During the 1990s supermarkets increased the selection of beers they o⁄ered as well as the
total shelf space devoted to beer. A study from this period found that beer was the tenth most
frequently purchased item and the seventh most pro￿table item for the average U.S. supermarket.4
Supermarkets sell approximately 20 percent of all beer consumed in the U.S.5
We aggregate data from each Dominick￿ s store into one of two price zones. For more details
about this procedure, see Hellerstein (2005).6 We de￿ne a product as one six-pack serving of a
brand of beer and quantity as the total number of servings sold per week. We de￿ne a market as
one of Dominick￿ s price zones in one week. Products￿market shares are calculated with respect
to the potential market which is de￿ned as the total beer purchased each week in supermarkets
by the residents of the zip codes in which each Dominick￿ s store is located. We de￿ne the outside
2The data can be found at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/kilts/research/db/dominicks/.
3Features of the Dominicks￿wholesale-price data con￿rm that brewers control distributors prices to the super-
market. Across individual Dominicks￿ stores, which may each be served by a di⁄erent distributor, each with an
exclusive territory, the variation in UPC-level wholesale prices is less than one cent. One cannot distinguish dis-
tributors by observing the wholesale prices they charge to individual Dominicks stores. This supports the industry
lore that distributors pricing is coordinated by brewers and is not set separately by each distributor to each retail
outlet.
4Canadian Trade Commissioner (2000).
5As our data focus on one metropolitan statistical area, we do not need to control for variation in retail alcohol
sales regulations. Such regulations can di⁄er considerably across states.
6The zones are de￿ned by Dominick￿ s mainly on the basis of customer demographics. Although they do not
report these zones, we identify them through zip-code level demographics (with a few exceptions, each Dominick￿ s
store in our sample is the only store located in its zip code) and by comparing the average prices charged for the
same product across stores. We classify each store according to its pricing behavior as a low- or high-price store and
then aggregate sales across the stores in each pricing zone. This aggregation procedure retains some cross-sectional
variation in the data which is helpful for the demand estimation. Residents￿income covaries positively with retail
prices across the two zones.
6good to be all beer sold by other supermarkets to residents of the same zip codes as well as all
beer sales in the sample￿ s Dominick￿ s stores not already included in our sample. We supplement
the Dominick￿ s data with information on manufacturer costs, product characteristics, advertising,
and the distribution of consumer demographics. Product characteristics come from the ratings of
a Consumer Reports study conducted in 1996. Summary statistics for the price data are provided
in Table 1. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the characteristics data used in the demand
estimation.
2.3 Preliminary Descriptive Results
We begin the analysis by documenting in several simple regressions whether Dominick￿ s imported-
beer prices are systematically related to movements in bilateral nominal exchange-rates. These
results can provide a benchmark against which to measure the performance of the structural
model. We estimate three price equations:
(1) lnpr
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where the subscripts j and t refer to product j in market t where a market is de￿ned as a week
and price-zone pair, pr is the log of a product￿ s retail price, pw is the log of a product￿ s wholesale
price, e is the log of a bilateral nominal exchange rate (domestic-currency units per unit of foreign
currency), wd is the log of a measure of local costs, wf is the log of a measure of foreign costs, and
" is a random error term. Local- and foreign-cost variables are included in the pricing equation to
control for supply and demand shocks other than exchange-rate changes that may a⁄ect a brand￿ s
price.
Table 3 reports results from estimation of the pricing equations. The ￿rst column of the
table reports the coe¢ cients from an OLS estimation of equation (1). The average pass-through
elasticity (￿) is 0.12 and is signi￿cant at the one-percent level. The domestic- and foreign-cost
variables are positive, as one would expect, and signi￿cant at the one-percent level. The regression
establishes a 12-percent benchmark for the retailer￿ s pass-through elasticity, to be compared with
the results from the structural model. The second column of Table 3 reports similar results from
estimation of the wholesale-price pricing equation, equation (2): Its pass-through elasticity is 12
7percent, and the coe¢ cients on the other variables are positively signed and signi￿cant. The
coe¢ cient on the foreign-cost variable is higher than in the retail-price regression: Foreign-cost
shocks are passed through at a slightly higher level at the wholesale than at the retail stage of
the distribution chain, as one would expect. This stage of the distribution chain is closer to
the original shock: There is no intermediating optimization of an upstream ￿rm to bu⁄er the
shock, as is the case for the retailer. The third column of Table 3 reports the results from an
OLS regression of each brand￿ s retail price on its own wholesale price. The coe¢ cient on the
wholesale price is close to one and signi￿cant, which is consistent with the results from the ￿rst
two columns: Exchange-rate shocks that are passed on by manufacturers to the retailer appear to
be immediately and almost fully passed on to consumer prices.
This preliminary analysis reveals that local-currency price stability is an important feature of
this market. It ￿nds that 12 percent of an exchange-rate change is transmitted to a beer￿ s retail
price. Where does the other 88 percent go? This incomplete transmission could be caused by the
local costs, markup adjustments, or ￿xed adjustment costs of manufacturers or retailers, as we
examine further in the structural model.
2.4 Patterns of Price Adjustment in the Data
A rough ￿rst idea of the timing and frequency of price changes in these data can be obtained from
Figure 1, which plots the retail and wholesale prices for a six-pack of the Dutch brand Heineken.
The ￿gure covers the full sample period, from the middle of 1991 to the middle of 1995. The
plot illustrates several important points. First, the ￿gure shows the great advantage of observing
price data at a weekly frequency. These data are ideal for analyzing the role of price stickiness,
because as the ￿gure illustrates, we clearly see prices remaining constant for several weeks, and
then jumping (in a discrete step) to a new level.7 In other words, the patterns in the price data
are exactly those one would expect with price stickiness. This could indicate the existence of
adjustment costs, or it could be that prices do not change simply because nothing else changes.
The other advantage of the data set is that we observe both retail and wholesale price data for
several ￿rms so we can examine the role of price stickiness at both stages of the distribution chain.
Retail prices always adjust when wholesale prices change in Figure 1. So it seems that the main
reason retail prices do not change in this market is that there is no reason for them to change
(the cost facing retailers as measured by the wholesale price does not change).
7The role of price stickiness cannot be analyzed within the framework Goldberg (1995, 2005) uses to analyze
the auto market or that Hellerstein (2005) uses to study the beverage market. Because the frequency of the data
used in these projects is either monthly (Hellerstein) or annual (Goldberg) the econometrician observes prices
changing every period given price observations averaged over time. Thus, any price stickiness that may exist is not
immediately apparent, or - put di⁄erently - cannot be identi￿ed from the data.
8Now at the wholesale level, it is an entirely di⁄erent story. There we know that we have
enormous variation in exogenous factors a⁄ecting costs (namely exchange-rate ￿ uctuations), yet
the wholesale prices clearly remain unchanged for long periods of time. Still, wholesale prices do
change from time to time, either because there are sales, or because the regular prices eventually
adjust.
The price inertia documented in the ￿gure leaves little doubt that both retail and wholesale
prices are "sticky" in the sense of not moving in every time period, or even in most. As the source
of this price stability does not seem to be an issue that can be settled through simple plots or
statistical exercises, we now turn to a more systematic investigation.
3 Model
This section describes the supply and demand sides of the model we use to assess the importance
of price rigidities in explaining incomplete exchange-rate pass-through.
3.1 Supply
We model the supply side of the market using a linear-pricing model in which manufacturers,
acting as Bertrand oligopolists with di⁄erentiated products, set their prices followed by retailers
who set their prices taking the wholesale prices they observe as given. Thus, a double margin is
added to the marginal cost of the product before it reaches the consumer. Our framework builds
on Hellerstein￿ s (2005) work on the beer market, but makes two modi￿cations to her model:
First, we introduce price rigidities both at the wholesale and retail level; the e⁄ect of these price
rigidities is to cause ￿rms to potentially deviate from their ￿rst-order conditions. Second, to keep
the framework as simple and transparent as possible, we model both retailers and manufacturers
as single-product ￿rms. While this assumption may be hard to defend, especially in the context
of the retailers, it is not essential for the approach we propose in order to identify price rigidities,
and can be relaxed in the future8.
The strategic interaction between manufacturer and retailer is as follows. First, the manu-
facturer decides whether or not to change the product￿ s price taking into account the current
period￿ s observables (costs, demand conditions, and competitor prices), and the anticipated reac-
tion of the retailer. If she decides to change the price, then the new price is determined based on
the manufacturer￿ s ￿rst-order conditions. Otherwise the wholesale price is the same as in the pre-
vious period. Next, the retailer observes the wholesale price set by the manufacturer and decides
8The assumption of single-product retailers would however be valid if manufacturers were able to enact vertical
restraints, hence exercising control over retailers￿ brand-level pricing and promotional decisions. In this case,
retailers will act as if they were single-product ￿rms with respect to each brand.
9whether or not to change the product￿ s retail price. If the retail price changes, then the new retail
price is determined according to the retailer￿ s ￿rst-order conditions. Otherwise the retail price is
the same as in the previous period. To characterize the equilibrium we use backward induction
and solve the retailer￿ s problem ￿rst.
3.1.1 Retailer
Consider a retail ￿rm that sells all of the market￿ s J di⁄erentiated products. Let all ￿rms use
linear pricing and face constant marginal costs. The pro￿ts of the retail ￿rm associated with












The ￿rst part of the pro￿t expression is standard. The variable pr
jt is the price the retailer sets for
product j, pw
jt is the wholesale price paid by the retailer for product j, ntcr
jt are local nontraded9
costs paid by the retailer to sell product j; and sjt(p
r
t) is the quantity demanded of product j which
is a function of the prices of all J products. The new element in our approach is the introduction
of the second term, Ar
jt, which captures the ￿xed cost of changing the price of product product j
at time t. This cost is zero if the price remains unchanged from the previous period, but takes on
a positive value, known to the retailer, but unknown to the econometrician, if the price adjusts
in the current period:
Ar




jt > 0 if pr
jt 6= pr
jt￿1
We interpret the adjustment cost Ar
jt as capturing all possible sources of price rigidity. These
can include the management￿ s cost of calculating the new price; the marketing and advertising
expenditures associated with communicating the new price to customers; the costs of printing
and posting new price tags, etc...The particular interpretation of Ar
jt is not important for our
purposes. What is important is that this cost is independent of the sales volume; it is a discrete
cost that the retailer pays every time the price adjusts from the previous period. The indexing of
A by product j and time t in our notation corresponds to the most ￿ exible speci￿cation, in which
the price adjustment cost is allowed to vary by product and time. However, one can potentially
impose more structure by assuming that adjustment costs are constant over time, and/or constant
across products.
9We use the term ￿nontraded￿ to indicate that these costs are paid in dollars no matter what the origin of the
product is. Hence, nontraded costs will not be a⁄ected by exchange rate shocks.
10The implication of the adjustment cost in the pro￿t function is that it can cause ￿rms to deviate
from their ￿rst-order conditions, even if the retailer acts as a pro￿t maximizer. Speci￿cally, in
the data we will observe one of two cases:
Case 1: The price changes from the previous period, that is pr
jt 6= pr
jt￿1.
In this case the retailer solves the standard pro￿t maximization problem to determine the new
optimal price, and the observed retail price pr











= 0, for j = 1;2;:::;Jt:
This gives us a set of J equations, one for each product. One can solve for the markups by de￿ning
a J ￿ J matrix ￿rt, called the retailer reaction matrix, with all o⁄-diagonal elements equal to




jt j = 1;:::;J; that is the marginal change
in the jth product￿ s market share given a change in the jth product￿ s retail price. The stacked
￿rst-order conditions can be rewritten in vector notation:










where the retail price for product j in market t will be the sum of its wholesale price, nontraded
costs, and markup.
The presence of the adjustment costs Ar
jt in the pro￿t function implies that for the retailer to
change her price in the current period, it will have to be the case that the extra pro￿ts associated
























kt) denotes the counterfactual market share that product j would have, if the
retailer had kept the price unchanged to pr
jt￿1, and pr
kt denotes the prices of the other products k
that may or may not have changed from the previous period. The above inequality simply states
that the pro￿ts the retailer makes by adjusting the price of product j in the current period have
to be greater than the pro￿ts the retailer would have achieved, if she had not changed the price,
in which case the ￿rst-order condition of pro￿t maximization would have been violated, but the
11retailer would have saved on the adjustment costs Ar
jt. By rearranging terms we can use the above
inequality to derive an upper bound Ar





















kt); k 6= j
Case 2: The price remains unchanged from the previous period, that is pr
jt = pr
jt￿1.
In this case the ￿rst-order conditions of pro￿t maximization do not necessarily hold. If the
retailer does not adjust the price of product j in period t, it must be the case that the pro￿ts she
makes from keeping the price constant are at least as large as the pro￿ts the retailer would have
made if she had adjusted the price according to the ￿rst-order condition minus the adjustment
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where prc
jt denotes the counterfactual price the retailer would have charged if he behaved accord-
ing to the optimality conditions, and sc
jt(prc
jt;pr
kt) is the counterfactual market share that would
correspond to this optimal price holding the prices of the competitor products at their observed
























kt); k 6= j
The essence of our empirical approach to quantify the adjustment costs can be described
as follows. First, we estimate the demand function. Once the demand parameters have been
estimated, the market share function sjt(pr







jt can be treated as known. Next we exploit the ￿rst-order conditions for each product
j (6) to estimate the nontraded costs and markups of product j, but contrary to the approach
typically employed in the Industrial Organization literature, we use only the periods in which the
price of product j adjusts, to back out costs and markups. In periods when the price does not
adjust, the nontraded costs are not identi￿ed based on the ￿rst-order conditions; however, we can
derive estimates of the nontraded costs for these periods by imposing some additional structure on
the problem, e.g., by modeling nontraded costs parametrically as a function of observables along
the lines described in the next section. Once estimates of nontraded costs for these periods have
been derived, we can calculate the counterfactual price prc
jt that the retailer would have charged
if there were no price rigidities and she behaved according to the pro￿t maximization conditions,
12as well as the associated counterfactual market share sc
jt(prc
jt;pr
kt). In the ￿nal step, we can exploit
inequalities (10) and (12) to derive upper and lower bounds of the adjustment costs Ar
jt.
Note that in the above framework price rigidities as captured by the adjustment cost Ar
jt
a⁄ect pricing behavior in two ways. First, there is a direct e⁄ect: price rigidities may prevent the
retailer from adjusting the price of any particular product if the adjustment cost associated with
this product￿ s price change exceeds the additional pro￿t. Second, there is an indirect e⁄ect that
operates through the e⁄ect that price rigidities may have on the prices of competing products.
When our retailer sets the price of product j, she conditions on the prices of the other products
with which product j competes. If these prices remain constant (potentially because of the
existence of price rigidities), then the price change of product j may be smaller than the one
we would have observed if price rigidities were altogether non-existent. The existence of this
indirect e⁄ect implies that relatively small adjustment costs can potentially lead to signi￿cant
price inertia. Accordingly, the magnitude of the adjustment costs cannot by itself provide a
measure of the signi￿cance of price stickiness in explaining incomplete pass-through. To assess
the overall impact of price adjustment costs it is necessary to perform simulations to compare
the pricing behavior we observe to the one that would prevail with fully ￿ exible prices. Section ?
discusses these simulations.
3.1.2 Manufacturers
Let there be M manufacturers that each produce one of the market￿ s Jt di⁄erentiated products.
Each manufacturer chooses its wholesale price pw
jt taking the retailer￿ s anticipated behavior into












t )) ￿ Aw
jt
where cw
jt is the marginal cost incurred by the manufacturer to produce and sell product j; this
cost is in turn a function of traded costs tcw
jt;and destination-market speci￿c nontraded costs ntcw
jt.
The distinction between traded and nontraded costs is based on the currency in which these costs
are paid. Traded costs are by de￿nition incurred by the manufacturer in her home country. As
such, they are subject to shocks caused by variation in the nominal exchange rate when they are
expressed in dollar terms. In contrast, dollar denominated nontraded costs are (by de￿nition)
incurred in the destination market (U.S.), and will not be a⁄ected by exchange-rate changes. The
term Aw
jt denotes the price adjustment cost incurred by the manufacturer. The interpretation of
this cost is similar to the one for the retail adjustment cost; it is a discrete cost that is paid only
13when the manufacturer adjusts the price of product j:
Aw




jt > 0 if pw
jt 6= pw
jt￿1
Given this structure, we can use the same procedure as the one we applied to the retailer￿ s
problem in order to derive upper and lower bounds for the manufacturer adjustment cost. The
derivation of the manufacturer bounds is however more complicated as the manufacturer needs
to take into account the possibility that the retailer does not adjust her price due to the existence
of the retailer adjustment cost.
As with the retailer, in the data we will observe one of two cases:
Case 1: The wholesale price changes from the previous period, that is pw
jt 6= pw
jt￿1.
Due to the existence of the retail adjustment cost, it is ￿in principle ￿possible in this case
that the retail price does not adjust, while the wholesale price does adjust. However, in our data
we do not observed a single instance of this happening. We therefore concentrate our discussion
on the case where the retail price adjusts when the wholesale price adjusts.
Assuming that manufacturers act as pro￿t maximizers, the wholesale price pw
jt must satisfy the
￿rst-order pro￿t-maximizing conditions given that it has been adjusted from the previous period:






= 0 for j = 1;2;:::;Jt:
This gives us another set of J equations, one for each product. Let ￿wt be the manufacturer￿ s





jt ; the change in each product￿ s share with respect to a
change in each product￿ s traded marginal cost to the manufacturer. The manufacturer￿ s reaction
matrix is a transformation of the retailer￿ s reaction matrix: ￿wt = ￿0
pt￿rt where ￿pt is a J-by-J
matrix of the partial derivative of each retail price with respect to each product￿ s wholesale price.
Each column of ￿pt contains the entries of a response matrix computed without observing the
retailer￿ s marginal costs. The properties of this manufacturer response matrix are described in
greater detail in Villas-Boas (2004) and Villas-Boas and Hellerstein (2004)10.
The manufacturers￿marginal costs (which are a function of the traded and nontraded costs,
tcw
t and ntcw
t respectively) are then recovered by inverting the manufacturer reaction matrix ￿wt
10To obtain expressions for this matrix, one uses the implicit-function theorem to totally di⁄erentiate the retailer￿ s








For product j, the wholesale price is the sum of the manufacturer traded costs, nontraded costs,
and markup function. The manufacturer of product j can use her estimate of the retailer￿ s
nontraded costs and reaction function to compute how a change in the manufacturer price will
a⁄ect the retail price for the product.
For the manufacturer to have changed her price from the previous period, it has to be the
case that the pro￿ts she makes from having changed the price (net of the price adjustment cost
Aw


















kt)); k 6= j
This conditions is similar to inequality (6) for the retailer, with a slight complication: the
counterfactual market share sc
jt that the manufacturer would fact if she left the price of product j
unchanged is a function of the counterfactual retail price prc
jt that the retailer would charge when
faced with an unchanged wholesale price pw
jt￿1. But given the existence of the retail adjustment
cost, this counterfactual price can follow one of two scenarios: the ￿rst one is that the retailer
does not change the price from the previous period, so that prc
jt = pr
jt￿1; the second possibility
is that the retailer adjusts her price according to the retailer￿ s ￿rst-order conditions (6). Hence,
before one can use the above inequality to infer the upper bound of the manufacturer￿ s adjustment























jt; k 6= j
the retailer will leave her price unchanged. Otherwise, she will adjust her price to prc
jt, where prc
jt













Once the optimal pricing behavior of the retailer, conditional on the wholesale price being equal
to pw
jt￿1has been determined, the upper bound of the manufacturer adjustment cost Aw
jtcan be





















kt)); k 6= j
where prc
jt is either equal to pr
jt￿1 or determined according to the retailer￿ s ￿rst-order condition,
and sc
jt is evaluated accordingly.




The lack of price adjustment in this case implies that the wholesale price is not necessarily
determined based on the manufacturer ￿rst-order condition. Regarding the retail price, it is again
conceivable that the retailer adjusts the retail price in periods when the wholesale price remains
unchanged. However, in practice we never observe this case in the data. Hence, we concentrate






Given that the manufacturer does not adjust the wholesale price, it has to be the case that
the pro￿ts she makes at pw
jt￿1 are at least as large as the pro￿t she would have made if she had
changed the price to a counterfactual wholesale price pwc
jt according to the pro￿t maximization






















jt; k 6= j
As with the case of the retailer, we can exploit this insight to derive a lower bound Aw
jt for the























kt); k 6= j
The determination of the counterfactual optimal wholesale price pwc
jt and the associated coun-
terfactual market share sc
jt is however more involved in this case, as the manufacturer has to take
into account the reaction of the retailer, who may or may not adjust her price in response to a
wholesale price change.
To ￿nd the price pwc
jt the manufacturer would set if she were willing to incur the adjustment
cost, we proceed as follows. First, we consider the case in which the retail price would have
changed in response to the wholesale price change. In this case pwc
jt would be determined according
to equation (??) which re￿ ects the manufacturer￿ s ￿rst-order condition; the inverted manufacturer
reaction matrix ￿￿1
wt in this equation incorporates the optimal pass-through of the wholesale price
change onto the retail price.
16Next we consider the case in which the retailer does not adjust her price in response to the
wholesale price change. Even though as noted above we never observe this case in the data,
the possibility that the wholesale price change does not get passed through by the retailer is
factored in when manufacturers set prices. If the manufacturer anticipates an equilibrium in
which the retailer does not adjust her price, the optimal manufacturer behavior will be to change
the wholesale price up to the point where the retailer is just indi⁄erent between changing the






















jt; k 6= j
The left hand side of the above equation denotes the pro￿ts the retailer would make if she did
not pass-through the change in the wholesale price. The right hand side represents the pro￿ts the
retailer would make if she changed the retail price to prc
jt, where the latter is determined based on











jt = 0. To ￿nd the wholesale price
pwc
jt the manufacturer would charge in this case, equation (21) can be solved simultaneously with
the retailer￿ s ￿rst-order condition for pwc
jt and prc
jt.
The ￿nal step in determining the counterfactual optimal wholesale price pwc
jt that the manu-
facturer would choose if she changed the wholesale price from the previous period is to compare
the manufacturer pro￿ts for the case where the retailer adjusts the price, to the manufacturer
pro￿ts for the case where the retailer does not pass-through the wholesale price change, in which
case the wholesale price will be set according to (21). The manufacturer will pick the pwc
jt that
corresponds to the higher pro￿ts. Once the wholesale price is found, the optimal retail price
response and associated market share can be determined as well, and inserted in (20) in order to
infer the manufacturer adjustment cost lower bound.
3.2 Demand
The estimation of costs, markups, and adjustment costs requires consistent estimates of the de-
mand function as a ￿rst step. Market demand is derived from a standard discrete-choice model
of consumer behavior. Given that the credibility of all our results will ultimately depend on the
credibility of the demand system, it is imperative to adopt as general and ￿ exible a framework as
possible to model consumer behavior. We use the random-coe¢ cients model described in Heller-
stein (2005), as this model was shown to ￿t the data well, while imposing very few restrictions on
the substitution patterns. In the following we provide a brief overview of the model, and refer
the reader to Hellerstein (2005) for a more detailed discussion.
Let the indirect utility uijt that consumer i derives from consuming product j at time t take
17the quasi-linear form:
(22) uijt = xjt￿i ￿ ￿ipjt + ￿jt + "ijt = Vijt + "ijt; i = 1;:::;I:; j = 1;:::;J:; t = 1;:::;T:
where "ijt is a mean-zero stochastic term: The utility from consuming a given product is a function
of a vector of product characteristics (x;￿;p) where p are product prices, x are product charac-
teristics observed by the econometrician, the consumer, and the producer, and ￿ are product
characteristics observed by the producer and consumer but not by the econometrician. Let the











+ ￿Di + ￿vi
where Di is a vector of demographics for consumer i, ￿ is a matrix of coe¢ cients that characterize
how consumer tastes vary with demographics, vi is a vector of unobserved characteristics for
consumer i, and ￿ is a matrix of coe¢ cients that characterizes how consumer tastes vary with
their unobserved characteristics. Conditional on demographics, the distribution of consumer
unobserved characteristics is assumed to be multivariate normal. The demographic draws give
an empirical distribution for the observed consumer characteristics Di: Indirect utility can be
expressed in terms of mean utility ￿jt= ￿xjt￿￿pjt+￿jt and deviations (in vector notation) from
that mean ￿ijt= [￿Di ￿vi] ￿ [pjt xjt]:
(24) uijt = ￿jt + ￿ijt + "ijt
Finally, consumers have the option of purchasing an ￿outside￿good; that is, consumer i can
choose not to purchase any of the products in the sample. The price of the outside good is assumed
to be set independently of the prices observed in the sample.11 The mean utility of the outside
good is normalized to be zero and constant over markets. The indirect utility from choosing to
consume the outside good is:
(25) ui0t = ￿
0t + ￿0Di + ￿0vi0 + "i0t
Let Aj be the set of consumer traits that induce purchase of good j. The market share of good j
11The existence of an ￿outside￿good means that the focus on a single retailer (Dominick￿ s) does not imply that
this retailer has monopoly power in the retail market; consumers faced with a price increase at Dominick￿ s have
the option of switching to beer sold in other supermarkets, which represents the ￿outside￿good in our framework.





where P￿(d￿) is the density of consumer characteristics ￿ =[D ￿] in the population. To compute
this integral, one must make assumptions about the distribution of the error term "ijt. Assuming
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The integral is approximated by the smooth simulator which, given a set of N draws from the










Given these predicted market shares, we search for the demand parameters that implicitly mini-
mize the distance between these predicted market shares and the observed market shares by using
a generalized method-of-moments (GMM) procedure.
4 Empirical Approach
Our empirical approach has two components: estimation and simulation. At the estimation stage,
we estimate the demand parameters, the traded and nontraded costs and markups of the retailer
and manufacturers, and the upper and lower bounds for the price adjustment costs. As noted
above, these bounds are not by themselves informative regarding the role of price rigidities in
explaining the incomplete cross-border cost shock transmission. To see why, suppose we estimate
the adjustment cost of changing the price of a particular product j to be very small at the retail
level. Still, as long as the adjustment cost is nonzero, it will cause the price of product j to remain
unchanged in some periods. This in turn will a⁄ect the pricing of competing products: if the price
of j does not change, then the prices of the products that do change may change by less than they
would if all prices adjusted. Similarly at the wholesale level, the presence of a small adjustment
cost at the retail level may cause the manufacturer to keep the wholesale level price constant if
she anticipates that the retailer will not pass-through the change. Hence, a small adjustment cost
may cause signi￿cant price inertia at both the retail and wholesale levels.
To assess the overall impact of adjustment costs on pricing behavior we employ simulation.
In particular, we compute the industry equilibrium that would emerge if the dollar appreciated
19(depreciated) and prices were fully ￿ exible, that is all adjustment costs were set to zero. Next we
compare this equilibrium to the one that prevails in the presence of price rigidities. We interpret
the di⁄erential response of prices across the two cases as a measure of the overall impact of nominal
price rigidities. In the following we describe each step of our empirical approach in more detail.
4.1 Estimation
The estimation stage consists of the following steps:
1. Demand Estimation
The estimation of the demand system follows Hellerstein (2005). We model the mean utility
associated with product j at time t as follows12:
￿jt= ￿tdj￿￿pjt+￿￿jt
where the product ￿xed e⁄ects dj proxy for both the observed characteristics xjt in the
term in equation (22) and the mean unobserved characteristics. The residual ￿￿jt captures
deviations of the unobserved product characteristics from the mean (e.g., time-speci￿c local
promotional activity) and is likely to be correlated with the price pjt; for example, an increase
in the product￿ s promotional activity may simultaneously increase the mean evaluation of
this product by consumers and a rise in its retail price. Addressing this simultaneity bias
requires ￿nding appropriate instruments, that is a set of variables zjt that are correlated
with the product price pjt but are orthogonal to the error term ￿￿jt. Input prices satisfy
this condition as they are unlikely to have any relationship to promotional activities while
they are by virtue of the supply relation correlated with product prices. To construct our
instruments we interact cost variables of two important inputs, the cost of barley in the
country of origin of each beer brand in our sample, and the cost of electricity in the Chicago
MSA, with indicator variables for each brand; this allows each product￿ s price to respond
di⁄erently to a given supply shock.
2. Back out the nontraded retail costs ntcr
jt and retail markups using data only for
the periods in which retail prices adjust.
Once the parameters of the demand system have been estimated, we compute the market
share function sjt(pr
t ) as well as the own and cross price derivatives
@skt
@pr
jt. Then we use the
12The demand model is also indexed by price zone z. In each period we have observations for two separate price
zones. To keep the exposition simple, we omit the subscript z from our notation.
20retailer￿ s ￿rst-order conditions for each product j (6) to estimate the nontraded retail costs
of product j.
3. Model these nontraded costs parametrically as a function of observables (e.g.,
zone dummies, month dummies, local wages), and estimate the parameters of
this function using data from the periods for which we observe retail price
adjustment.
The procedure described under Step 2 allows us to back out the retailer￿ s nontraded costs for
the periods for which we observe the price of a product adjusting, so that we can reasonably
assume that the retailer sets the new price according to the ￿rst-order conditions. However,
this approach does not work in periods in which the price does not change. To get estimates
of the nontraded costs for these periods we employ the following procedure:
First, we collect the data on the nontraded costs ntcr
jt in Step 2 for the periods in which
the price of product j adjusted. Then we model these costs parametrically as a function of
observables:
ntcr
jtz = ￿jzdz + ￿jwwd
t + ￿
jtz
where dz are price zone dummies, and wd
t denote local wages. We let the coe¢ cients be
product-speci￿c, as price changes are not synchronized so that we cannot pool data across
products. We run the above regression using data from the periods we observe price adjust-
ment, and then use the parameter estimates to construct the predicted nontraded costs for
the periods for which we do not observe price adjustment.
4. Derivation of Upper and Lower Bounds for the Retailer Price Adjustment Costs
Ar
jt.
With the demand parameter and nontraded cost estimates in hand, we employ (10) and (12)
to derived the upper and lower bounds of the retailer adjustment costs Ar
jt. The computation
of the upper bound is straightforward: in (10) all variables are observed, except for the
counterfactual market share sc
jt(pr
jt￿1;pr
kt) that product j would have if the retailer did not
change her price from the previous period. This counterfactual share can however be easily
evaluated once the demand parameters are estimated, given that the market share function
is known.
The computation of the lower bound based on (12) requires the derivation of the counterfac-
tual optimal price prc
jt that the retailer would charge if she changed the retail price from the
previous period, and the associated market share sc
jt(prc
jt;pr
kt). These are computed using
(8) which re￿ ects the ￿rst-order condition of the pro￿t maximizing retailer.
215. Back out the manufacturer marginal cost cw
jt using data only for the periods in
which wholesale prices adjust.
The procedure here is similar as the one we employ to derive the nontraded costs for the
retailer. In periods when the wholesale price changes, manufacturers behave according to
their ￿rst-order conditions. Hence, we can use equation (16) to back out the manufacturer
marginal cost cw
jt.
6. Model the manufacturer marginal cost parametrically as a function of observ-
ables (e.g., time dummies, local and foreign wages), and estimate the parameters
of this function using data from the periods for which we observe wholesale price
adjustment.
The manufacturer ￿rst-order conditions we utilize under Step 5 allow us to back out the
total marginal cost of the manufacturer; however they do not tell us how to decompose
this cost into a traded and nontraded component. Furthermore, it is not possible to back
out the marginal manufacturer costs for the periods when wholesale prices do not adjust
based on this procedure, given that the ￿rst-order conditions do not necessarily hold then.
To accomplish the above tasks, we model the total manufacturer costs parametrically as a
function of observables, and estimate this function using data from the periods of wholesale
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t + Fj ￿ ￿jfw ln(ejtw
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t denote local domestic and foreign wages respectively, ejt is the bilateral
exchange rate between the producer country and the U.S., and Fj is a dummy that is equal
to 1 if the product is produced by a foreign supplier, and zero otherwise. All variables
and parameters are indexed by j to indicate that we estimate a separate equation for each
product, as the asynchronous adjustment of wholesale prices implies that we cannot pool
data across products given that we con￿ne the estimation to the periods for which we
observe price changes, and these periods are di⁄erent for each product. For the function
to be homogeneous of degree 1 in factor prices, we require ￿jdw + Fj ￿ ￿jfw = 1. Equation
(30) can be easily estimated by Least Squares.
22The estimation of the above equation for the manufacturer marginal cost serves two pur-
poses. First, it allows us to decompose the total marginal cost into a traded and a nontraded
component. Recall that by de￿nition the traded component refers to the part of the marginal
cost that is paid in foreign currency and hence is subject to exchange-rate ￿ uctuations. For
domestic producers the traded component will be (by de￿nition) zero. Foreign producers
selling in the U.S. will generally have both traded and local nontraded costs. The latter are
captured in the above speci￿cation by the term (wd
t)￿jdw that indicates the dependence of
foreign producers￿marginal costs on the local wages in the U.S.. The speci￿cation in (29)
can be used to demonstrate two important facts regarding foreign suppliers￿costs. First,
foreign producers selling to the U.S. will typically experience substantially more volatility
than domestic producers due to their exposure to exchange-rate shocks. Second, as long as
the local nontraded cost component is nonzero (so that ￿jfw < 113), the dollar denominated
marginal cost of foreign producers will change by a smaller proportion than the exchange
rate. This incomplete marginal cost response may partially explain the incomplete response
of exchange-rate changes on to prices.
Estimation of the marginal cost equation (30) furthermore allows us to use the parameter
estimates to construct predicted values for the manufacturer traded and nontraded costs for
the periods in which wholesale price adjustment is not observed.
7. Derivation of Upper and Lower Bounds for the Wholesale Price Adjustment
Costs Aw
jt.
The ￿nal step is to use all parameter estimates obtained in the previous steps to compute
the upper and lower bounds of the manufacturer price adjustment costs based on (18) and
(20).
Consider inequality (18) ￿rst that determines the adjustment cost upper bound. Once steps
1-6 are completed, all variables in this inequality are known, except for the counterfactual
retail price prc
jt that the retailer would charge if the manufacturer did not change her price
in that period. The counterfactual price prc
jt can take on one of two values: it is either equal
to pr
jt￿1, or it is determined according to the retailer￿ s ￿rst-order condition, conditional on
the retailer observing the wholesale price pw
jt￿1. To determine which of the two prices the
retailer will choose, we ￿rst solve for the optimal price that the retailer would pick if she
behaved according to her pro￿t maximization condition. Then we compare the retail pro￿ts
13Given the assumption of ￿jdw + Fj ￿ ￿jfw = 1 which guarantees homogeneity of degree 1 of the marginal-cost
function in factor prices, if local nontraded costs are zero, then ￿jdw = 0 and ￿jfw = 1. In contrast, with positive
nontraded costs we will have ￿jfw < 1.
23evaluated at this retail price, to the pro￿ts that the retailer would make if she kept the
retail price unchanged at pr
jt￿1. The retailer will choose the price associated with the higher
retail pro￿ts. Once the counterfactual retail price prc
jt has been determined this way, the




kt));k 6= j; can easily be evaluated.
Next consider inequality (20) that determines the adjustment cost lower bound. Again, all
variables in this inequality can be treated as known once steps 1-6 are completed, except
for the counterfactual retail and wholesale prices, prc
jt and pwc
jt respectively, which we would
observe if the manufacturer changed her price from the previous period. To determine those,
we consider two cases. In the ￿rst case the retail price changes from the previous period; the
optimal prices pwc
jt and prc
jt are then determined according to the manufacturer and retailer
￿rst-order conditions, equations (16) and (6) respectively, with the inverted manufacturer
reaction matrix ￿￿1
wt re￿ ecting the optimal pass-through of the wholesale price change onto
the retail price. Let ￿wc




Next, consider the case in which the retail price does not change, even though the wholesale
price does. As noted earlier, the optimal manufacturer pricing behavior in this case will
involve changing the wholesale price up to the point where the retailer is just indi⁄erent
between changing her price and keeping it constant at pr
jt￿1. The optimal wholesale price
will then be determined based on equation (21) along the lines discussed in the previous
section. Let ￿wc






2 , the manufacturer will set the wholesale price anticipating that the retailer will
adjust her price too. Hence, the counterfactual prices pwc
jt and prc
jt will satisfy the conditions
described under the ￿rst case above. If ￿wc
1 < ￿wc
2 , the manufacturer will price the product
anticipating that the retailer will not adjust her price. The resulting counterfactual wholesale
price will then satisfy the indi⁄erence condition discussed under the second case, while the
retail price will remain unchanged at pr
jt￿1.
Once the counterfactual wholesale and retail prices have been determined, evaluation of the
adjustment cost lower bound based on (20) is straightforward.
4.2 Simulation and Decomposition of Incomplete Exchange-Rate Pass-Through
(to come)
245 Results
This section ￿rst discusses results from the estimation of the demand system. It then describes
preliminary estimates of brand-level markups, nontraded costs, and upper and lower bounds on
both the retailer￿ s and the manufacturers￿adjustment costs.
5.1 Demand Estimation: Logit Model
Table 4 reports results from estimation of demand using the multinomial logit model. Due to
its restrictive functional form, this model will not produce credible estimates of pass-through.
However, it is helpful to see how well the instruments for price perform in the logit demand
estimation before turning to the full random-coe¢ cients model.
Table 4 suggests the instruments may have some power. The ￿rst-stage F-test of the instru-
ments, at 39.47, is signi￿cant at the one-percent level. The consumer￿ s sensitivity to price should
increase after we instrument for unobserved changes in characteristics. That is, consumers should
appear more sensitive to price once we instrument for the impact of unobserved (by the econo-
metrician, not by ￿rms or consumers) changes in product characteristics on their consumption
choices. It is promising that the price coe¢ cient falls from -0.93 in the OLS estimation to -1.49
in the IV estimation. Note that the 95-percent con￿dence interval of the latter coe¢ cient does
not include the value of the former.
5.2 Demand: Random-Coe¢ cients Model
Table 5 reports results from estimation of the demand system. We allow consumers￿age and
income to interact with their taste coe¢ cients for price, maltiness, bitterness, hoppiness, and
percent alcohol. As we estimate the demand system using product ￿xed e⁄ects, we recover the
mean consumer-taste coe¢ cients in a generalized-least-squares regression of the estimated product
￿xed e⁄ects on product characteristics.
The coe¢ cients on the characteristics generally appear reasonable. As consumers￿income
rises, they become less price sensitive. The random coe¢ cient on income, at 1.48, is signi￿cant
at the ￿ve-percent level. The mean preference in the population is in favor of a malty and/or
hoppy taste in beer: Both characteristics have positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients. The mean
coe¢ cient on a bitter ￿ avor is negative, though the random coe¢ cient that re￿ ects the in￿ uence
of unobserved heterogeneity in the population on the mean coe¢ cient is positive and signi￿cant,
indicating a taste for bitterness in some parts of the population. Finally, as the percent alcohol
rises, the mean utility in the population also rises, an intuitive result. The minimum-distance
weighted R2 is .50 indicating these characteristics explain the variation in consumer demand fairly
25well.
5.3 Retail Markups and Nontraded Costs
Table 6 reports retail and wholesale prices and markups for selected imported brand. The markups
are derived using ￿rms￿￿rst-order conditions. Under the assumption of no adjustment costs, the
markups are derived using the ￿rst-order conditions of every product in every period. Under the
alternative assumption of some adjustment costs, the markups are derived in each period by using
the ￿rst-order conditions of only those products whose prices adjust from the previous period.
The markups appear reasonable. Table 8 compares the retailer￿ s nontraded costs estimated in
periods when a brand￿ s price adjusted with the ￿tted values from a regression of these nontraded
costs on their determinants for those periods in which a brand￿ s price did not adjust. It appears
that the regression produces ￿tted values that match the means of each brand￿ s non-traded cost
series fairly well.
5.4 Results: Adjustment Costs
Table 9 reports the median estimates by brand of the upper and lower bounds on the retailer￿ s
and manufacturers￿adjustment costs as a share of their total revenue from that brand. The
bounds generally are consistent for each brand as well across the brands. The lower bound is
indistinguishable from zero across brands for both retail and wholesale prices. The upper bounds
on adjustment costs to retail prices range from 0.1 percent of revenue for Guinness to 5.3 percent
of revenue for Becks, with a median upper bound across the foreign brands of 2 percent. The
upper bounds on adjustment costs for wholesale prices range from 1.6 percent of revenue for
Heineken to 6.3 percent of revenue for Beck￿ s, with a median upper bound across foreign brands
of 4.4 percent, more than twice the median upper bound on the retailer￿ s adjustment costs.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the relationship of the mean market share to the mean upper bounds
on adjustment costs in dollar terms and on adjustment costs as a share of total revenue for both
the retailer and the manufacturer. Figure 2 clearly illustrates that larger upper bounds on retailer
and manufacturer adjustment costs are positively associated with brands￿market shares. Figure
3 indicates that the upper bounds on retailer and manufacturer adjustment costs, as a share of
their total revenue, are negatively associated associated with brands￿market shares.
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retail price wholesale price
Figure 1: Weekly retail and wholesale prices for Heineken beer. Prices are for a single six-pack














































retail manufacturer Linear (retail) Linear (manufacturer)
Figure 2: Larger upper bounds on retailer and manufacturer adjustment costs are associated with






























































retail manufacturer Linear (retail) Linear (manufacturer)
Figure 3: The upper bounds of retailer and manufacturer adjustment costs, as a share of their
total revenue, are negatively associated with brands￿market shares. Source: authors￿calculations.
31Description Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Retail prices ($ per six-pack) 5.44 5.79 1.28
Wholesale prices ($ per six-pack) 4.50 4.92 1.09
Dummy for retail-price change (=1 if yes) .37 0 .49
Dummy for wholesale-price change (=1 if yes) .11 0 .32
Table 1: Summary statistics for prices for the 16 products in the sample. 6464 observations.
Source: Dominick￿ s.
Description Mean Median Std Minimum Maximum
Percent Alcohol 4.52 4.60 .68 2.41 6.04
Bitterness 2.50 2.10 1.08 1.70 5.80
Maltiness 1.67 1.20 1.52 .60 7.10
Hops (=1 if yes) .12 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Sulfury/Skunky (=1 if yes) .29 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿


































Table 3: Some preliminary descriptive results. The dependent variable is the retail or wholesale
price for a six-pack of each imported brand. Foreign costs are monthly prices of barley in the
country of origin of each brand. Domestic costs are monthly hourly wages in supermarkets in the
Chicago MSA for the retail price and hourly wages in the distribution sector for the manufacturer￿ s
price. The exchange-rate is the weekly average of the previous week￿ s spot rate. Source: Authors￿
calculations.
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Table 4: Diagnostic results from the logit model of demand. Dependent variable is ln(Sjt) ￿
ln(Sot). Both regressions include brand ￿xed e⁄ects. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Costs are domestic costs proxied by domestic energy use and foreign costs proxied by malt
and barley prices which are described in the text. Source: Authors￿calculations.












Percent Alcohol 7.09￿ -1.32￿
(:19) (:26)
GMM Objective 182.94
M-D Weighted R2 .50
Table 5: Results from the full random-coe¢ cients model of demand. Based on 6464 observations.
Asymptotically robust standard errors in parentheses. Starred coe¢ cients are signi￿cant at the 5-percent
level. Source: Authors￿calculations.
Brand Retail price Manufacturer price Retail markup Manufacturer markup
Bass 6:91 5:84 :77 :62
Beck￿ s 5:74 4:40 :92 :48
Corona 5:68 3:65 1:06 :38
Guinness 7:44 5:69 :97 :71
Heineken 6:18 4:70 :97 :44
Molson Golden 5:09 3:62 :47 :38
St. Pauli Girl 6:22 4:61 :94 :44
Table 6: Median prices and price-cost markups for selected brands. The markup is price less








Molson Golden 83 102
St. Pauli Girl 54 61
Overall 42 46
Table 7: Observed and derived non-traded costs incurred by the retailer by brand Each entry
reports the mean across markets of the observed or derived measure of a brand￿ s non-traded cost to the
retailer in cents per six-pack.
Brand Bass Becks Corona Guinness Heineken Molson St. Pauli
wages .50 .06 .23 .35 .54 .32 .07
(.19)￿￿ (.09) (.12) (.26) (.21)￿￿ (.16)￿￿ (.11)
feature -.54 -.22 -.51 -.33 -.92 -.29
(.09)￿￿ (.09)￿￿ (.20)￿￿ (.12)￿￿ (.11)￿￿ (.11)￿￿
transport costs 3.08
(1.31)￿￿
R2 .55 .10 .10 .26 .29 .56 .21
Observations 32 47 25 27 23 37 33
Table 8: Results from regressions of observed retailer non-traded costs on determinants. Dependent
variable is retailer￿ s non-traded cost which varies by brand and market. Huber-White robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Source: Authors￿calculations.
Retail Manufacturer
Brand Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound
Bass 3:0% 0:0% 4:6% 0:0%
Beck￿ s 5:3% 0:0% 6:3% 0:0%
Corona 0:3% 0:0% 2:6% 0:0%
Guinness 0:1% 0:0% 4:8% 0:0%
Heineken 1:5% 0:0% 1:6% 0:0%
Molson Golden 0:6% 0:0% 5:8% 0:0%
St. Pauli Girl 3:4% 0:0% ￿ 0:0%
Overall 2:0% 0:0% 4:4% 0:0%
Table 9: Upper and lower bounds for the retailer￿ s and manufacturers￿adjustment costs by brand.
Each entry reports the median across markets of the estimates of a brand￿ s price-adjustment cost as a share
of its total revenue.
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